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THE NEW YORK PENAL LAW: A PROSECUTOR'S EVALUATION
HowAmD A. LEViNE*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE New York Penal Law became effective September 1, 1967. Even cursory
comparison of this statute with the 224 articles and more than 1200 sections
of specific provisions in the former law leads one to view as an understatement
Governor Rockefeller's description of the new law as "the first major and
comprehensive revision of the Penal Law since 1881."1 The extended lack of
attention to criminal law revision in New York was surprising in that the sub-
stantive law of crime of any society must be considered its most fundamental
and basic instrument of social control. As Professor Herbert Wechsler, Chief
Reporter for the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, and a charter
member of the New York State Temporary Commission on Revision of the
Penal Law and Criminal Code has recently stated:
The aim of the whole process after all is to define and within reasonable
limits to enforce what Professor Henry M. Hart aptly calls "those
minimum obligations of conduct which the conditions of community
life impose upon every participating member if community life is to
be maintained and to prosper. '2
This writer has served continuously as a prosecutor since 1961 in an in-
dustrialized community, having a population of roughly 160,000. The city is
fairly typical of up-state urban counties. During this experience, ample op-
portunity has been afforded to form a professional opinion of New York's
attempt to redefine and enforce those "minimal obligations of conduct." Of
course, since the new Penal Law is still in the infancy of its operation, any
conclusion must still be tentative. Judicial interpretation of the new law's
provisions must be awaited to determine how well it will actually operate. Also,
interdisciplinary analyses of crime rate statistics, trends and other pertinent data
should be undertaken and continued to determine whether the new law is ful-
fulling an overall deterrent purpose.
This article is an evaluation of the new Penal Law based on the above
experience. Initially, the structural draftsmanship of the new law is discussed.
This is followed by an analysis of the practical importance of the substantive
changes which the new law has enacted. Finally, some questions, criticisms, and
general conclusions concerning the new Penal Law are offered.
The basic premise of this evaluation is that a penal law cannot be success-
ful unless it can be understood and applied with reasonable ease. Obviously
* B.A., LL.B. Yale University; District Attorney, Schenectady County, New York.
1. N.Y. Penal Law, Governor's memorandum at XXXV (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. Pen. Law]. See also, Legis. Doc., No., 41, p. 8 (1962).
2. Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code,
68 Colum. L. Rev. 1425, 1431 (1968).
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these considerations are important to a prosecutor. Modern realities have also
made them abundantly important to society as a whole.
Recently, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice reported on the undue delay in the disposition of
criminal cases in the United States.3 As much as two years has been found to
have elapsed between arrest and trial.4 This problem appears to be most acute
at the lower court levels.5 Delays in these courts in the District of Columbia,
for example, have produced a high rate of rearrests of persons released while
awaiting trialY As a result, recent proposals have been made to institute the
drastic remedy of "preventive detention."7 These situations are consistent with
what has been experienced in this writer's relatively small county in upstate New
York. The reasons behind the delays are the modern realities of increased case
loads, pre-trial procedures on confessions and searches and seizures, and pre-
liminary examinations in felony cases. These facts, combined with limited
prosecutorial and judicial manpower, have greatly increased the time necessary
to dispose of cases. A clear and consistent penal law is indispensable if one is
to swiftly apply the lengthy criminal process to its conclusion and thus fulfill
the value inherent in our society's maxim: "Justice delayed is justice denied."
II. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
In terms of its number of provisions, the new Penal Law is justifiably
smaller than its predecessor. The many archaic provisions of the former law,
such as those dealing in detail with the heating of railroad cars by stove or
furnace, and dueling challenges, have been eliminated. In addition, the many
provisions of the former law which were basically regulatory, such as those
dealing with conservation, business, agriculture and banking, and to which
criminal sanctions had been attached but rarely enforced by police officers, were
shifted to the specific bodies of law dealing with their particular subject matter.
The alphabetized arrangement of the former Penal Law-starting with
"Abandonment," then to "Abduction" and ending with "Women" and "Wrecks"
-was a trap for the unwary or harried prosecutor who had to submit charges
to a grand jury or had to advise police officers on the charges to make in a book-
ing following arrest. Under that arrangement, related crimes dealing with the
same or factually related subject matter were rarely found in the same place.
For example, if a public official had engaged in misconduct involving the use of
his public office for personal gain under the former law, the possibly applicable
provisions were in numerically disparate locations. Section 372-Officer Accept-
ing Bribe, section 855-Public Officer Taking Illegal Fees Commits Extortion,
3. The President's Commission Report on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Criminal Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts (1967).
4. Id. at 80.
5. Id. at 31.
6. Id. at 39.
7. Id. See also, Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law § 279.30(2) (b) (Edward
Thompson Co. ed., 1967); Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 (1950).
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section 1823-Asking or Receiving Bribes, were all possible relevant provisions.
Also, myriad other sections dealing with specific officials, such as judicial
officers,8 legislatorsP and public service commissioners' 0 might have been ap-
plicable. Under the new Penal Law, such conduct in all its variations is covered
under two articles comprising a total of some 15 sections. Arranged consecutively,
these sections also cover the crimes committed by the "giver" of the illegal
benefit."
Self-defense sections under the former law were found in the General
Provisions' 2 and the assault and homicide articles.13 The insanity defense, ap-
plicable to all crimes, was not found in the General Provisions, but instead under
article 104-Incompetent Persons. Disorderly conduct 14 and riots and unlawful
assemblies, 15 obviously and expressly concerned with the same general threatened
or actual breaches of the "public peace," were located hundreds of sections apart.
Even such clearly related crimes as burglary 16 and criminal trespass17 were kept
separate under the former law. This grouping probably explains why the criminal
trespass provisions were rarely employed as an alternative charge in burglary
trials.
The practice of continuous piecemeal amendment of the former Penal Law
also resulted in a tendency toward a prolixity of provisions which were too
narrow and specific and which covered basically the same proscribed conduct.
Malicious injury to property, for example, was covered by twenty-five detailed
sections and many more subdivisions.' s These were replaced under the new
Penal Law by a mere seven sections. 19 Gambling offenses under the pre-1967
Penal Law included some fifty-four sections within two articles, gambling and
lotteries2 0 Without any basic change in coverage, the new law substitutes nine
sections, including a definition of terms. " The simplification and generalization
employed in drafting provisions in the latter areas, and many others under the
new law, can be expected to avoid the wasted time and effort brought about by
8. Former N.Y. Penal Law § 372 (McKinney 1944) [hereinafter cited as former N.Y.
Pen. Law].
9. Id. § 1328.
10. Id. § 1981(2).
11. N.Y. Pen. Law arts. 195 and 200. These articles are respectively entitled "Official
Misconduct and Obstruction of Public Servants Generally" and "Bribery Involving Public
Servants and Related Offenses."
12. Former N.Y. Pen. Law § 42.
13. Id. §§ 246(3) and 1055 respectively.
14. Id. art. 70.
15. Id. art. 188.
16. Id. art. 38, 99 400-08.
17. Id. § 1425(9): Unlawful intrusion into a building located in a city or village;
id. § 2036: unlawful intrusions upon land located in a city or village. Intrusions into buildings
or upon land located in a town were technically not covered by the former Penal Law.
18. Id. art. 134, 99 1420-38.
19. N.Y. Pen. Law art. 145, §§ 145.00-145.30.
20. Former N.Y. Pen. Law arts. 88 and '130.
21. N.Y. Pen. Law art. 225, §§ 225.00-225A0.
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over-specificity and prolixity. The case of People v. Costello22 is illustrative of
the problems which arose under the former law. In Costello, the defendant
was accused of maliciously deflating automobile tires. He was able to reverse
his conviction only after a full trial in the district court and succeeding appeals
to the highest court in New York. The ground for reversal was that the "catch-
all" malicious mischief section2- was employed in framing the charge, rather
than the specific section dealing with damaging an automobile.2
The shortcomings of the organization and structure of the former law were
compounded by the fact that the two principal textual sources used by most
prosecutors and police2O 5 were poorly indexed. As a result, except in dealing with
the most common crimes, an inordinate amount of time was spent leafing
through possible articles. In addition, this procedure made it quite possible for
pertinent charges to be omitted.
In contrast, the arrangement of the new Penal Law is far more sensible and
has proven far more workable. A tight analytical arrangement has been sub-
stituted for the haphazard alphabetical order in the former law. First, the over-
all division of the new law into four parts-General Provisions, Sentences,
Specific Offenses and Administrative Provisions-has been accurately and con-
sistently adhered to. Second, the definitions of specific offenses have been
logically arranged by subject matter. This arrangement, to a great extent,
eliminates the danger of inadvertently omitting pertinent charges and provides a
far greater probability of finding all of the crimes which may have some ap-
plicability to particular conduct. Third, a tightly knit and consistent organization
with respect to the degrees of each individual crime has been employed. Starting
with the least serious degree, constituting the basic crime, the new law derives
higher degrees by the addition of further aggravating factors to the basic crime.
The analytical organization of subject matter by grouping related offenses
and providing an orderly, systematic and consistent arrangement of degrees of
crimes at least affords a more rational basis in the substantive law for the prac-
tice of negotiating pleas to lesser crimes. Such organization must be the first
step toward imposing some order and standards upon the "plea bargaining"
process. In addition, the experience of this writer in teaching the new Penal
Law in police training courses for recruits and experienced officers-both for
the New York State Municipal Police Training Council and in local training
programs immediately before the new law went into effect-has demonstrated
the advantage of the foregoing organization in terms of its comprehensibility by
enforcement personnel.
22. 305 N.Y. 63, 110 N.E.2d 880 (1963).
23. Former N.Y. Pen. Law § 1433.
24. Id. § 1425(11-a).
25. Gilbert Criminal Law and Practice of New York (Bender c.1918, annually revised);
former N.Y. Pen. Law.
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III. IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES
A. Gradations of Crimes and Punishments
The new Penal Law reflects important changes in the gradations of crimes
and punishments which will have an impact upon the work of the prosecutor.
With the exception of attempts2 6 and to some degree conspiracy,27 the significant
changes in gradation were in a downward direction. The downgrading of offenses
and punishments in several important areas were by and large desirable, since
they now more accurately reflect the degree of seriousness of the offense and the
severity of its condemnation by contemporary society. In these areas, the new
gradations will also enhance the expeditious disposition of offenders through the
criminal process.
The harshness of some of the provisions and punishments of the former
Penal Law did not necessarily lead to successful enforcement and prosecution.
Often, the severity boomeranged to produce jury resistance to conviction. Also,
judges sometimes sought to circumvent the harsh statutes by strictly construing
them so as to avoid their applicability to a particular situation. Illustrative of
the latter point was the treatment of the crime of kidnapping, which carried a
sentence of 20 years to life under the former law. In People v. Levy 28 and
People v. Lombardi,2 the Court of Appeals was confronted with abductions
which were basically incidental to the commission of other crimes. Levy
primarily involved a robbery, while Lombardi was principally concerned with
a rape. In a previous decision, People v. Florio30 these types of asportations
or confinements which were incidental to another crime were nevertheless held
to constitute kidnapping. As the opinions in both Levy and Lombardi expressly
concede, the literal language of the statute made no exceptions based on whether
the kidnapping was "subsidiary" or "incidental" to another crime. The Court,
however, overruled Florio and ignored the literal language of the statute in
reversing the convictions for kidnapping when thus "incidental" to other crimes.
The opinions of reversal were quite candid in disclosing that the reason for this
26. Attempts, except in relation to capital offenses, were covered under former N.Y.
Pen. Law § 261. Those who were convicted of an attempted crime under this section could
be imprisoned for not more than one half of the maximum term of confinement for the
completed offense attempted.
Under the new Penal Law, the gradation classification for attempt is one degree lower
than the completed crime. See N.Y. Pen. Law § 110.05. Thus, under the new law's provision,
an attempt may be criminally classified as any of four types of felonies or two types of
misdemeanors. Id.
Under the latter system, it is acknowledged that, in some instances, the penalty for an
attempted crime may be more severe than it was under the former law. Id. Comm'n. staff
notes.
27. Conspiracies to commit kidnapping in the first degree or murder were previously
punishable by a maximum of seven years imprisonment. Former N.Y. Penal Law § 580-a.
Such conspiracies are now regarded as Class C felonies, punishable by fifteen years imprison-
ment. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 105.15, 70.00(2) (c).
28. 15 N.Y.2d 159, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 204 N.E.2d 842 (1964).
29. 20 N.Y.2d 266, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519, 229 N.E.2d 206 (1967).
30. 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
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severe judicial tailoring of the statute was the harsh penalties for kidnapping.
The new Penal Law has removed the objectionable features of the former
law by breaking down asportative and confining crimes into two degrees of
kidnapping, two degrees of custodial interference and two degrees of unlawful
imprisonment.' The distinctions between each degree are based on the relevant
factors of the length of and purpose of confinement, the danger to the victim
and the use of force perpetrated by the offender.
In the treatment of offenses formerly covered under the assault provisions
of the former Penal Law, the revisers carved out offensive, provocative but
non-injurious conduct. The push, slap, shove and menacing gesture had con-
stituted misdemeanor assault under the old law. These acts will now generally be
subject to the petty offense of harassment, a violation.3 2
Many difficulties had been encountered in prosecuting these cases as mis-
demeanor assaults under the former Penal Law. These acts are ordinarily
spontaneous and unpremeditated. The neighborhood quarrel or bar-room scuffle
was the typical situation which led to the assault charge. Furthermore, the
defendant had the right to a jury trial, which merely prolonged the proceedings,
delayed speedy disposition, and further exacerbated the feelings of the parties.
jury resistance to imposing a criminal record on the defendant was also often
evident. The ultimate disposition in most instances was acceptance of a plea to
a reduced charge of disorderly conduct. The harassment charge for this kind
of conduct has been an effective alternative. It has permitted far more expedi-
tious handling of the cases and appears to satisfy the reasonable expectations
of the parties.
B. Creation of New Crimes and Expansion of Existing Ones
Comprehensive revision of a statute which was basically the product of the
Victorian era required not only the elimination of outdated provisions, but also
expansion of the substantive law of crime to include forms of conduct viewed
as less serious or even unheard of eighty years ago. Thus, the new Penal Law
has recognized that the ubiquituous credit card has become the equivalent of
cash for a variety of services which are not covered under the larceny provisions
of the former law. Therefore, the new law has extended the coverage of the
theft of services provision to include the fraudulent use of this device.3 3 In the
area of consumer fraud, prosecutors have recently been receiving many more
complaints by the public concerning the modern phenomena of the "fly-by-
night" contractor and the "door-to-door" repairman. These artists had avoided
the reach of the former penal law, which required a misrepresentation of an
existing material fact before a charge of larceny by false pretenses could be
established 3 4 The new law affords some promise of subjecting the "con man"
31. N.Y. Pen. Law art. 135.
32. Id. § 240.25.
33. Id. § 165.15(1).
34. See People v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213, 81 N.E.2d 817 (1948).
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to criminal sanctions under section 155.05(2)(d). This provision adds to the
definition of larceny, the obtaining of property "by false promise" through mis-
representation of future conduct.3 5
In addition to being a significant advancement in the area of gradations
of crimes and punishment,36 the new provision covering harassment is an im-
portant contribution to substantive criminal law. This provision has recognized
that citizens are entitled to penal law protection from harm which may be
neither economic nor technically physical. Thus, this section prohibits conduct
calculated to vex, annoy or place an individual in fear. 37 Basically, it penalizes
the abhorrent person who attempts to create psychological insecurity in another.
If an individual engages in a more serious and sophisticated form of vexatious
behavior which is difficult to control, he may be guilty of the misdemeanor of
"aggravated" harassment.3 8 The typical conduct which the latter provision
proscribes is the repeated "dunning" or obscene phone call.
Previously, the orientation of the law was such that little could be done
about the above type of conduct, unless the state's interests were endangered by
a threatened or intended breach of the public peace. The only significant ap-
plicable provision under the former Penal Law was disorderly conduct.3 9 This
provision required proof of "intent to provoke a breach of the peace . . . [or
circumstances by which] a breach of the peace may be occasioned .... -40
Consequently, it had to be shown that the conduct had occurred in a public
place and that the external circumstances at the time were such that a specific
intent or potential public disturbance was present. The new harassment provision
negates these problems by specifically covering the private disturbance, i.e.,
disturbance of an individual which does not constitute a public disturbance.
However, this provision is desirable not only because a right to be free from
calculated harassing ought to be protected in our advanced society, but also
because of the possibility that an even more violent response may be made to
such conduct. Thus, as a deterrent provision, the harrassment section may
nip the potential public disturbance in the bud.
Two other significant crimes created by the new law are criminal facilita-
tion4' and criminal solicitation.42 These provisions penalize the person who
35. In order to distinguish criminal theft by false promise from civil breach of contract,
however, the new law's formulation requires proof "wholly inconsistent with innocent intent
or belief, and excluding to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of the defendant's
intention or belief that the promise would not be performed." N.Y. Pen. Law § 155.05(2) (d)
(emphasis added).
Strict application of this very high standard of proof will make successful prosecution
of such conduct most difficult. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. N.Y. Pen. Law § 240.25(5).
38. Id. § 240.30.
39. Former N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 720, 722.
40. Id. § 722. See People v. Perry, 265 N.Y. 362, 193 N.E. 175 (1934); People v.
Douglas, 29 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Nassau Cty. Ct. 1941).
41. N.Y. Pen. Law art. 115.
42. Id. art. 100.
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attempts to cause in any way, and who intends that another person commit, a
substantive crime.43 Also covered is the individual who engages in conduct which
'he believes will probably aid the commission of a crime, but does not specifically
intend to cause, partake in, or profit from the crime.44 It is clear that these
provisions provide a sanction against conduct which is sufficiently dangerous and
contra the social order to subject the actor to penal control. Under the former law,
however, such acts could not be penalized because prosecutors were required to
show that the person actually intended to be a part of the commission of the sub-
stantive crime which he solicited or aided.45 If such intent could not be proven,
the defendant had to be found completely innocent. With the addition of facilita-
tion and solicitation provisions, alternative charges may be brought, and, when
the evidence is insufficient to establish the requisite intent to partake in the
crime solicited or aided, the defendant may be found guilty of the lesser new
crimes.
Finally, what should prove to be one of the most significant innovations in
the new law is its expanded coverage of the area of conduct wherein the state
of mind of the actor is reckless rather than intentional. Under the former Penal
Law, reckless conduct was penalized only in the case of homicide4" and in cases
of actual physical injury resulting from the operation of an automobile4 7 or
the use of a weapon while hunting.48 Under the new Penal Law, a reckless state
of mind is sufficient under all three degrees of assault, two degrees of reckless
endangerment, three degrees of homicide and three crimes involving the actual or
threatened destruction of property.49
The expansion of substantive criminal law to include more types of reckless
conduct represents a value judgment. Given the modern means of destruction
available to the public in our complex technological society, it is proper to im-
pose a greater duty to avoid a clearly foreseeable risk of harm. An actor who
"consciously disregards" such risks and grossly deviates from normal standards
of conduct is sufficiently dangerous to be subjected to the controlling and
rehabilitative processes of the criminal law.
43. Id. §§ 100.00, 100.05, 100.10.
44. Id. §§ 115.00, 115.05.
45. See former Pen. Law. § 2 (par. 6). This provision covered what was termed the
"accessory before the fact" at common law. The substance of this provision is adopted and
stated much more clearly in the new Penal Law. In addition, the new law's brief provision
covers the common law "principal" in the first and second degrees. N.Y. Pen. Law § 20.00.
Apparently, the revisers felt that since the culpability in each of the three categories was
essentially the same, they all should be covered by the same provision.
46. See former N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 1052(3) (manslaughter in the second degree), 1053-a
(death caused by negligent operation of a vehicle), 1053-c (death due to negligent use of
a weapon by another while hunting), 1053-e (death caused by negligent operation of a
vessel).
47. Id. § 244(2).
48. Id. § 247.
49. The crimes which cover destruction of property are N.Y. Pen. Law §8 145.00(2)
(criminal mischief), 145.25 (reckless endangerment of property), 150.05 (arson in the third
degree).
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IV. SoM QUESTIONS AND CRITIcISMs
Any product of human endeavor as far-reaching and comprehensive as a
complete revision of a state's penal law cannot be expected to have covered
every possible problem of both substance and draftsmanship. The following is
this writer's view of the new Penal Law's shortcomings in those areas.
A. Draftsmanship
1. Entrapment
The New York revisers, following the lead of the Model Penal Code and the
new codes of other jurisdictions, created the statutory defense of entrapment.50
Previously, such a defense was non-existent in the statutory criminal law of New
York. The defense is most significant in prosecutions involving commercialized
vice and organized crime. The most prevalent offenses which fall under the latter
headings involve gambling and drugs. These offenses normally connote a "vic-
tim" who is the willing, factual accomplice of the offender. In addition, the
general public is usually not strongly motivated to aid in the enforcement of
the sanctions against these crimes. As a result, an increased use of under-cover
agents has been necessitated in order to obtain sufficient evidence for conviction.
These agents place "bets" and make "buys" in order to secure the proper proof.
When evidence is obtained in the above manner, the entrapment defense is
inevitably raised and submitted to the jury. As an affirmative defense, the ac-
cused must maintain the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the
evidence.5 ' The elements of entrapment which the defendant must prove are: 1)
"active" inducement or encouragement by a police officer; and 2) that the
methods of inducement were "such as to create a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it.1152 Because
the second element is phrased in terms of "a person," rather than the person,
it may be argued that this provision imposes a uniform standard of behavior on
the police. Therefore, if the police created a "substantial risk that the offense
would be committed" by any person, rather than the particular defendant, the
accused would be acquitted. Under this interpretation, the predilections of the
individual defendant who raised the defense would be irrelevant. Evidence of
such predilection, such as proof of previous similar acts of misconduct, would
be inadmissible to rebut the defense.
However, it is submitted that there is another interpretation of this pro-
vision which is more in accord with the traditional concept of entrapment.
Apparently, the cases of Sorrells v. United States" and Sherman v. United
States 4 form the basis for this New York provision.55 The majority opinions in
50. Id. § 35.40.
51. Id. § 25.00(2).
52. Id. § 35.40 (emphasis added).
53. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
54. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
55. See N.Y. Pen. Law J 35.40, comm'n staff notes.
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these cases focused on the individual defendant who raised the defense. As such,
the Court approached the matter by inquiring whether this particular defendant
would have committed the crime he was accused of absent the inducements of
the police. Under this approach, the defendant's "predispostion and criminal
design" are relevant, and may be proven by his prior record in order to rebut
the defense.50 This interpretation is buttressed by a statement of the New York
revisers: "As a practical matter, therefore, the defense of Entrapment would
not be available to the person who regularly engages in illegal enterprise.15 7
2. Larceny by False Promise
Another question of interpretation, which is left unanswered by the new
Penal Law, may arise in connection with the newly created crime of larceny
by false promise.58 In order to differentiate this crime from civil breach of con-
tract, the new Penal Law imposes a rigorous standard of proof. It must be
established "that the facts and circumstances of the case are wholly consistent
with guilty intent or belief and wholly inconsistent with innocent intent or be-
lief. . . ." Typically, such fraudulent intent can best, if not solely, be shown
through evidence that the perpetrator has victimized a host of other parties
under similar circumstances. For example, if a sham contractor is charged with
this crime, it could be shown that he has completely defaulted in performance
under many similar contracts after receiving a cash deposit. Clearly, such evi-
dence is highly probative of guilty intent in the particular case in which he
was charged with the crime. However, since the previous acts may not have
been proven to be "crimes" involving such intent, and since those acts may
not have been closely related in time to the particular situation being litigated,
such evidence may not be admissible under the traditional categories allowing
evidence of prior crimes to show guilty intent 09 To comply with the high
standard of proof required by the new provision, such evidence will certainly
be needed. A strong argument for admissibility of this type of proof can be
advanced by analogizing to the federal rule in criminal receiving cases. This
rule permits proof of prior receipts of stolen goods for the purpose of proving
guilty knowledge. 0° Evidence of such receipts is admissible even though proof
of guilty knowledge as to the prior receiving is absent.61
3. Extreme Emotional Disturbance
Still another interpretation problem under the new Penal Law may arise
in connection with the affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance"
56. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451, (1932).
57. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35A0, comm'n staff notes.
58. Id. § 155.05(2)(d).
59. See Richardson on Evidence §§ 175-82 (Prince ed. 1964). See also People v. Fiorl,
12 N.Y.2d 188, 200, 237 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701, 188 N.E.2d 130, 132 (1963).
60. See United States v .Brand, 79 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
655 (1935).
61. 79 F.2d at 606.
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which reduces murder to manslaughter in the first degree.62 Apparently, the
main purpose of this provision is to include the common law doctrine of mitiga-
tion in the Penal Law.63 This doctrine reduces intentional homicide from murder
to "voluntary manslaughter" when the killing was the result of "heat of passion"
or "provocation." The former Penal Law did not clearly contain this doctrine. 4
Manslaughter in the first and second degrees had been defined as killings "com-
mitted without a design to effect death," 65 which under no circumstances would
have constituted murder.66
Under the new Penal Law, murder is reduced to manslaughter in the first
degree if the defendant proves, as an affirmative defense, that he
* . . acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant be-
lieved them to be ...6
At common law, the "provocation" or "heat of passion" which would mitigate a
homicidal act from murder to manslaughter was determined on the basis of an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness or "adequate" cause.6 8 Since the main purpose
of the new law's provision is to adopt this doctrine, its standard should have
been adopted also. However, the new law's dual phraseology of "extreme emo-
tional disturbance" and "under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be" raises the possibility that the defense will be applied on the basis
of a subjective rather than objective standard. This would open the door for
psychiatric evidence as to the particular defendant's powers of self-control and
perception. In turn, this would result in common law voluntary manslaughter
being changed to the concept of "diminished responsibility."
A strong argument can be made for the admissibility of the above type
of psychiatric testimony in those jurisdictions having two degree of murder.69
Whether a defendant whose mental state falls short of qualifying for the in-
sanity defense, was nevertheless incapable of premeditation at the time of his act,
is certainly a relevant question in determining whether he is guilty of murder
62. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 125.20(2), 125.25(1)(a).
63. Id. § 125.20. comm'n staff notes.
64. See former N.Y. Pen. Law. §§ 1050, 1052.
65. Id.
66. Felony murder and a homicide accomplished "by an act imminently dangerous to
others, and evincing a depraved mind" also constituted murder in the first degree. Id. §
1044(2). Thus, although these killings could be accomplished "without a design to effect
death," they could not constitute manslaughter if, under the circumstances, they amounted
to murder. Even this type of murder could not be reduced to manslaughter by any provisions
similar to N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 125.20(2), 125.25(1) (a).
67. N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.25(1) (emphasis added).
68. See 1 0. L. Warren and B. M. Bilas, Warren on Homicide §§ 92-100 (1914);
Michael and Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide 11, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 1261,
1281-82 (1937).
69. See Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime,
59 Yale L.J. 951 (1947). See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476-95 (1945)
(dissenting opinions of Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge, JJ.).
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in the first or second degree. However, since his intent is to effect death, his
crime should be nothing short of murder. This view is consistent with that of
the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions which have rejected any
other application of the diminished responsibility concept.70 Since New York
now has only one degree of murder,71 the diminished responsibility concept
should not be "read into" the defense of "extreme emotional disturbance."
Rather, such "disturbance" should be judged by the objective standard fol-
lowed at common law.
B. Substance
Under the former Penal Law, the temporary taking of a motor vehicle
without the permission of the owner was deemed a larceny.72 Since most of
the vehicles so taken were obviously worth more than $100, the majority of
these thefts constituted the felony of second degree grand larceny. 73 Therefore,
most of these cases required prosecution by grand jury indictment. Typically,
the defendant in these cases was a youth out for a "joy-ride." Consequently,
the normal final disposition was a conviction and sentence under the Youthful
Offender Law.74
The new law has at least enabled the prosecutor to cut short the indictment
stage. In the absence of provable intent to permanently deprive the owner of
his vehicle, and irrespective of the value of the car taken, the new law charac-
terizes common "joy-riding" as a misdemeanor.70 Youthful offender treatment,
if warranted, can still be obtained in the lower courts where the range of al-
ternative sentencing provisions is quite lenient and narrow, except for the pos-
sible maximum term of commitment.
Although the new provision is advantageous in that it saves time and man-
power, its true value may better be measured by careful scrutiny of crime
statistics. From January, 1968 to September, 1968, during which unauthorized
use of a vehicle was a misdemeanor, a substantial amount of auto thefts took
place in this writer's city of Schenectady. In fact, during the same period in
1967, when the crime was a felony, 50% fewer auto thefts were reported. For
the 1968 period, there was a national overall increase over 1967 of only 22%.
7 0
However, in the seven cities of New York State having more than 100,000
people, there was an aggregate increase in 1968 of 38% over 1967.7 7 Based
on these few figures, it would seem that the deterrent effect of the law on auto
70. See H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 189-94 (1954).
71. Compare former N.Y. Pen. Law '§§ 1044, 1046 with N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.25. See
N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.25, comm'n staff notes.
72. Former N.Y. Pen. Law § 1293-a.
73. Id. § 1296(1). In many other cases, the vehicle taken was worth §500 or more.
Therefore, such thefts became grand larceny in the first degree. Id. § 1294(3). Furthermore,
regardless of the value of the car, if it was stolen "in the night time," first degree grand
larcency could be charged. Id. § 1294(1).
74. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc., tit. VII-B, §§ 913-e-913-r (McKinney 1958).
75. N.Y. Pen. Law § 165.05.
76. See Uniform Crime Reports (Federal Bureau of Investigation pamphlet ed. 1968).
77. Id.
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thefts has been significantly lessened by the new provision. If this trend con-
tinues, the change in gradation must be deemed a mistake.
The major substantive shortcoming of the new Penal Law is its treatment
of sentences for violations. Under the present statutory scheme, the only al-
ternative penalties for convicted violators are fines of up to $250,78 incarcera-
tion for up to 15 days7 9 and a conditional80 or unconditional discharge.81
Probation has been eliminated as a possible disposition under the new law.
While the "conditions" which may be imposed for conditional discharge are
the same as those which might have been imposed under a sentence of proba-
tion,8 2 the experience has been that such conditions are not self-executing.
Under a sentence of probation, a violator could be periodically examined to
insure that he is complying with the conditions of his sentence. While the latter
process creates a high probability that the offender will be completely rehabili-
tated, the same cannot be said for the conditional discharge procedure which
includes no periodic examination.
Another serious fault in the new sentencing for violations is the lack of
a provision for increases in punishment for repeated conviction for the same
type of criminal conduct. The effect of this omission is graphically illustrated
by the existing prostitution situation. The continually convicted prostitute faces
a maximum of only 15 days imprisonment for each offense. In New York City,
in 1968, there occurred a 27% increase in arrests for prostitutions over 1967.83
In comparison to 1966, the last full year under the old law, there occurred a
70% increase in 1968.84 On the basis of these statistics, it may be strongly
argued that "one of the nation's most lenient laws" on prostitution 5 is fulfilling
neither a deterrent nor a rehabilitative purpose. If the reason for this increase
is indeed due to rearrests of the same offenders, recidivist provisions in the
new law are mandated.
In the abstract, one may agree with the attitude of the revisers that, when
an offense is not deemed to be grave enough to be a crime, a sentence of im-
prisonment is a "severe sanction" and "the term should be no more than a
token that will serve as a deterrent in cases where a fine might be considered
by the offender to be a tax or license fee." 86 However, in the case of recidivism,
it is appropriate to focus upon control and rehabilitation of the offender. This
cannot possibly be accomplished under the present sentencing scheme for vio-
lations. An increase in punishment for recidivism or a raising of the repeated
offense to misdemeanor status is necessary. Such action would be consistent with
a basic purpose of the new Penal Law:
78. N.Y. Pen. Law § 80.05(4).
79. Id. § 70.15(4).
80. Id. § 65.05(3).
81. Id. § 65.20.
82. Id. § 65.10.
83. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. N.Y. Pen. Law § 70.15, comm'n staff notes.
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To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses
through the deterrent influence of a sentence if authorized, the re-
habilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when required
in the interests of public protection.8 7
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the aforementioned shortcomings, the new Penal Law is a valuable
and important contribution to the criminal process in New York. From a pros-
ecutor's standpoint the new statute, on the whole, satisfies the two crucial con-
siderations-administrative effectiveness and enforceability.
Basically, as to the first consideration, the new Penal Law has been found
to be workable. The new statute contains precise definitions of crime which
are nevertheless broad enough to encompass those forms of conduct which
should be controlled through penal sanctions. Also, on the whole, the new law
is free of "bugs" in the form of anomalies, inconsistencies and uncertainties.
Finally, the new Penal Law can be easily applied and understood. This con-
sideration is most important to law enforcement personnel since, based on the
new law's provisions, they must draft charges and make hurried decisions which
will withstand possible challenge in the courts.
As to the second consideration-enforceability-the new law is certainly
of sufficient clarity. Jurors, who have received only a single exposure to the
legalistic language of the new statute in the form of court instructions at the
end of a trial, have nevertheless been able to follow and apply the new law
with comparative ease. In addition to clarity, the new law, on the whole, pro-
vides sensible gradations of offenses. These permit jurors to choose among
reasonable alternatives in arriving at a verdict and allow prosecutors to accept
reduced charges. The latter procedure has become absolutely necessary because
of the current prevalence of heavy caseloads and clogged criminal calendars.
Most importantly, in terms of enforceability the substance of the new
Penal Law conforms to standards of justice in the community and thereby has
gained the support of the public. Without such support, any codification and
revision of the criminal law must fail as an instrument of social control. This
is so because a penal law is only one element in the continuing process of
criminal justice in a society. In this process, a penal law must interact at suc-
ceeding stages with other laws, notably, procedural provisions. However, its
most crucial interaction is with people-the general public, the offender, the
police, juries and judges.
A prime example of the latter interaction was the treatment of the justifica-
tion provisions under the new law. Specifically, the provisions on the use of
"deadly physical force" by the home occupant and police officer 8 caused a
problem. As originally drafted, these sections were prolix and unclear. As a
87. Id. § 31.05(5) (emphasis added).
88. Id. §§ 35.15, 35.20, 35,30.
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result, they were widely misunderstood and attacked both by law enforcement
personnel and the general public. Undoubtedly, if these provisions had had to
be applied to a particular case, they would have generated interpretative dif-
ficulties for the accused, the judge, and the jury. Consequently, and correctly,
these provisions were substantially revised and reorganized by the 1968 New
York Legislature. 9 Whether the changes made were merely as to drafting, or
also as to substance, is not clear. It was believed that the original provisions
prevented the policeman and the homeowner from using "deadly physical force"
in defense in many dangerous situations. The 1968 revision has at least dis-
sipated this belief, even if it was unfounded. Thus, the support of the public
has been won and a high probability now exists that these provisions will be
a significant instrument of social control.
It is apparent in terms of societal value, that it is abundantly important
that the provisions of a penal law conform to the standards of justice in the
community. Also significant is the simplicity, consistency, clarity and complete-
ness of the law, since these factors will determine whether the law will enhance
or detract from the promptness and efficiency of criminal justice according to
the community standard. A question of much less consequence is whether a
new Penal Law's abstract principles or doctrines are pure enough to cover the
unusual problem, the rare set of circumstances which will undoubtedly arise.
It is hoped that the latter consideration will not, as it has in the past, cause
the New York Legislature to destroy the success of this new panel statute by
the practice of piecemeal amendment. Such amendments may satisfy the needs
of the moment or the demands of special interest groups. However, at the same
time, they are likely to confuse the overall philosophy and destroy the internal
consistency of the law.
89. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1968, ch. 73, amending N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 1030, art. 35.

